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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Orrin T. Skretvedt, a former 
employee of defendant E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Company ("DuPont"), from the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment for DuPont on Skretvedt's suit 
alleging that DuPont had denied his claim for disability 
benefits under its pension and benefits plans in violation of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. S 1001 et seq. For the reasons that follow, we will 
reverse. 
 
The appeal first presents several questions about our 
scope of review, which we resolve in favor of applying the 
arbitrary and capricious standard prevalent in ERISA 
cases. We do not find the exceptions to that standard 
applicable here. Most significantly, we do not think the fact 
that DuPont's Associate Medical Director was involved in 
evaluating Skretvedt's claim both during the initial 
determination and on appeal creates a procedural 
impropriety that heightens the standard of review. 
 




Despite the demanding arbitrary and capricious test, we 
conclude that the medical evidence of job-related stress 
that Skretvedt presented clearly demonstrates that he is 
eligible for disability benefits under Dupont's"Incapability 
Retirement" pension plan, one of the forms of disability 
benefits that he claims. Although we take the evidence in 
the light most favorable to DuPont, we are not convinced by 
DuPont's arguments that the medical evidence was 
inconclusive or equivocal with respect to the severity or 
permanence of Skretvedt's incapability to perform 
successfully the duties of his position. Indeed, Dupont can 
point to no truly conflicting medical evidence. Dupont's 
decision was "without reason," and it was"unsupported by 
substantial evidence." Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Abnathya v. 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It was therefore 
arbitrary and capricious, requiring us to reverse the grant 
of summary judgment and to direct that summary 
judgment be entered on the Incapability Retirement claim 
in favor of Skretvedt. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Skretvedt worked as an environmental engineer for 
DuPont from June 28, 1974, until February 7, 1995, when 
he was discharged. At that time, Skretvedt held the position 
of Senior Research Environmental Engineer at DuPont's 
Spruance Plant in Richmond, Virginia. Among other things, 
he was responsible for ensuring that the plant complied 
with federal environmental regulations. Skretvedt's job 
responsibilities and the pressures associated with them 
increased significantly in 1994 when certain regulations 
under the Clean Air Act went into effect and the 
department where he worked was simultaneously 
downsized. 
 
In early 1994, Skretvedt began receiving treatments for 
work-related anxiety from his family physician, Harold 
Binhammer, M.D., who periodically prescribed to him the 
anti-anxiety drug Lorazepam. Skretvedt took a leave of 
absence from his job at the Spruance Plant beginning on 
November 11, 1994, and did not return to work at Dupont 
 




thereafter.1 In November 1994, Dr. Binhammer diagnosed 
Skretvedt with depression, prescribed the antidepressant 
Paxil and referred him to a psychiatrist, Graenum R. Schiff, 
M.D. Dr. Schiff saw Skretvedt periodically beginning in 
November 1994. Schiff put Skretvedt on a regular daily 
dose of twenty milligrams of Paxil and referred him for 
therapy with Teresa A. Buczek, Ph.D., a clinical 
psychologist who specializes in work-related stress 
disorders. 
 
On December 5, 1994, James E. Layton, M.D., the 
Medical Supervisor at the Spruance Plant, wrote to Drs. 
Binhammer, Schiff and Buczek, requesting that they 
complete medical report forms to help him prepare a 
written opinion on whether Skretvedt's condition qualified 
him for disability benefits under DuPont's pension plan. All 
three doctors responded to Dr. Layton's request, giving 
their diagnoses and medical opinions of the severity and 
likely duration of Skretvedt's condition. We describe these 
opinions in greater detail below. 
 
DuPont fired Skretvedt on February 7, 1995, citing the 
incident in which he was accused of taking home a 
company fax machine without permission as the reason for 
the discharge. See supra note 1. Skretvedt filed a claim 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), alleging that DuPont violated the Americans with 
Disabilties Act (ADA) by discriminating against him based 
on his anxiety disorder. The EEOC found no violation of the 
ADA based on the information that Skretvedt submitted, 
and issued him a right-to-sue letter. By September 1995, 
Skretvedt had contacted an attorney regarding his ADA and 
disability benefits claims. On September 29, Skretvedt, 
acting on the advice of counsel, signed a "Settlement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Skretvedt was not officially terminated until February 7, 1995. The 
parties disagree about the reason that Skretvedt went on a leave of 
absence. Skretvedt contends that he was put on medical leave on the 
recommendation of his physician. DuPont counters that Skretvedt was 
asked to go on leave pending the outcome of an investigation into his 
taking home a fax machine from the office without permission (Skretvedt 
claims that he took it home for work-related use). As will appear, the 
alleged incident with the fax machine has little bearing on whether 
Skretvedt is eligible for disability benefits under DuPont's pension plan. 
 




Agreement and Release of All Claims" with DuPont. Under 
this agreement, Skretvedt released all of his employment- 
related claims against DuPont except for his application for 
disability benefits, which DuPont agreed to review in a 
"neutral" manner. 
 
DuPont's pension plan provides two different long-term 
disability benefits: (1) the "Incapability Retirement" pension 
("incapability benefits"); and (2) the "Total and Permanent 
Disability Income Plan" ("T & P benefits"). An employee is 
eligible for incapability benefits if he is "permanently 
incapable of performing the duties of his position with the 
degree of efficiency required by the Company, and he has at 
least 15 years of service." Under its separate T & P benefits 
plan, DuPont provides additional benefits to individuals 
who are "disabled by injuries or disease and presumably 
will be totally and permanently prevented from pursuing 
any gainful occupation." At all times relevant to this 
litigation, it was the practice of DuPont's three-member 
Board of Benefits and Pensions ("Board"), which was 
responsible for administering both disability benefits plans, 
to first determine whether an employee qualified for 
incapability benefits.2 If so, the Board would determine 
whether the employee also qualified for T & P benefits. 
 
Following the September 29, 1995 settlement agreement, 
the Board reviewed Skretvedt's claims for disability 
benefits. The Board considered the medical evidence that 
DuPont's Dr. Layton had collected from Skretvedt's treating 
physicians and psychologist as well as a medical opinion 
from Dr. Layton himself, and determined that Skretvedt 
was not eligible for either type of long-term disability 
benefits. On May 23, 1996, the Board denied Skretvedt's 
application for both incapability and T & P benefits and 
issued a one-page form letter denying his benefits claims. 
The letter stated that Skretvedt had failed to show that he 
was "permanently incapable of performing the duties of 
[his] job with the degree of efficiency required by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In April 1997, DuPont outsourced the task of reviewing all employee 
benefits claims to an insurance company. However, Skretvedt's 
application, both before and after 1997, was processed using the internal 
review procedure that DuPont used before April 1997. 
 




Company, at the time of [his] termination." It also advised 
him that in order to succeed on his appeal he would need 
to submit "additional objective evidence that will indicate a 
total impairment of function." The letter provided examples 
of such "objective evidence," including "tests such as MRI, 
x-ray reports and complete medical evaluations," but 
warned that "[o]pinions of healthcare providers are not 
sufficient without objective medical evidence to support 
such opinions." 
 
Skretvedt contends that he and Dr. Binhammer sent 
three letters to the Board's designated contact for appeals, 
requesting clarification of the types of "objective medical 
evidence" needed to perfect his application on appeal in 
light of the fact that his claimed disability is psychological.3 
After receiving no response for almost a year, Skretvedt 
formally submitted his appeal to the Board on May 16, 
1997. He included with his application updated letters from 
the doctors who had examined him prior to his initial 
application, as well as letters and evaluation forms from 
other doctors. After hearing nothing from the Board for 
more than three more months, Skretvedt wrote to DuPont 
inquiring about the status of his appeal. He received no 
immediate response. 
 
Having received no response from the Board, Skretvedt 
initiated the present lawsuit by filing a complaint on 
February 4, 1998, invoking 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B), which 
allows a beneficiary of an ERISA-governed benefits plan to 
sue for "benefits due to him under the terms of the plan." 
Skretvedt alleged that DuPont's pension and benefits review 
board had violated ERISA by arbitrarily and capriciously 
denying him disability benefits, by acting in bad faith, and 
by operating under a conflict of interest. The parties 
entered into a stipulation agreeing to stay the proceedings 
until October 1, 1998, pending a final decision by the 
Board on Skretvedt's appeal for disability benefits. The 
parties also stipulated that the Board's decision on 
Skretvedt's appeal would "be the only decision for the 
purpose of judicial review of the denial of benefits." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. DuPont denies receiving these letters. 
 




Following the October 1, 1998 stipulation, Skretvedt 
resubmitted the materials that he had included in his 
initial appeal application as well as additional materials. 
These included updated opinion letters from Drs. 
Binhammer and Schiff, and a psychological evaluation 
report and opinion letter from Richard B. Zonderman, 
Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist who had performed 
some standardized psychological tests on Skretvedt. All of 
these physicians and psychologists concluded that 
Skretvedt was unable to return to his previous job at 
DuPont. Skretvedt also submitted the "Explanation of 
Determination" that he received from the Social Security 
Administration following the denial of an application that 
he had filed for social security disability benefits. The 
explanation concluded that Skretvedt's "condition prevents 
[him] from doing the type of work that [he] has done in the 
past," but that he did not qualify for social security 
disability benefits because his disability "does not prevent 
[him] from doing less demanding work that does not require 
extensive public contact." 
 
Skretvedt held two different jobs during the period 
following his termination from DuPont. In the spring of 
1995, he established his own furniture repair and 
refinishing business. The business earned a modest profit 
in 1995, but lost money in 1996, and Skretvedt was forced 
to seek other employment. Beginning in May 1996, 
Skretvedt took a job with the Virginia Department of Labor 
as a compliance inspector. The position involved a two-year 
training period, during which his job responsibilities 
gradually increased. Skretvedt's work-related anxiety and 
depression increased in 1998 as his training period ended. 
As a result, Dr. Schiff recommended that Skretvedt take a 
two-month medical leave of absence beginning on August 
17, 1998. Skretvedt has since resigned from his position at 
the Virginia Department of Labor. 
 
The Board finally denied Skretvedt's appeal for disability 
benefits on October 13, 1998. Following the Board's final 
decision, discovery in the present suit proceeded, after 
which the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. Acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636, a magistrate 
judge reviewed the motions and recommended that the 
 




District Court grant DuPont's motion for summary 
judgment and deny Skretvedt's cross-motion. The District 
Court approved the report and issued the recommended 
orders. Skretvedt now appeals. The District Court had 
jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of 
summary judgment. See Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The familiar standards that we apply when reviewing 
motions for summary judgment are set forth in the margin.4 
 
II. Standard of Judicial Review of the Board's 
Decision 
 
Skretvedt argues that the District Court erred by 
reviewing the Board's denial of his disability benefits under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, and that it should 
have applied a heightened standard of review due to the 
structural conflicts of interest and procedural irregularities 
in DuPont's pension benefits review system. In Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the 
Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of 
review for courts to apply when reviewing an employer's 
denial of a benefit under an ERISA-governed plan. Drawing 
on principles of trust law, the Court held that where, as 
here, an employer's pension plan gives discretion to a plan 
administrator or fiduciary to interpret the plan and make 
benefits determinations, "a deferential standard of [judicial] 
review [is] appropriate." Id. at 111. When reviewing the 
denial of pension benefits under ERISA where the pension 
plan commits discretion to the fiduciary, we have employed, 
as Bruch directs, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986). The judge's function at the summary judgment stage is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 




See, e.g., Keating v. Whitmore Mfg. Co., 186 F.3d 418, 420- 
21 (3d Cir. 1999). A court reviewing a benefits denial under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard must defer to the 
plan administrator unless the administrator's decision was 
"without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence, or 
erroneous as a matter of law." Pinto v. Reliance Standard 
Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393 (quoting Abnathya v. 
Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
In Bruch, the Court also went on to state that "if a benefit 
plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is 
operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be 
weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an 
abuse of discretion." 489 U.S. at 115 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Interpreting this language, we have held 
that even when a pension plan commits discretion to a 
fiduciary or plan administrator, a reviewing court should 
apply a heightened standard of review "either when the 
plan, by its very design, creates a special danger of a 
conflict of interest, or when the beneficiary can point to 
evidence of specific facts calling the impartiality of the 
administrator into question." Goldstein v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 251 F.3d 433, 442 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pinto, 214 
F.3d at 383-87). 
 
In Pinto, we specifically identified two conditions that 
indicate a special danger of a conflict of interest that would 
warrant applying a heightened standard of review. These 
are: (1) when a pension plan is unfunded, i.e., not 
"actuarially grounded, with the company making fixed 
contributions to the pension fund," 214 F.3d at 388, but 
rather funded by the employer on a claim-by-claim basis; 
and (2) when a plan is administered by an administrator 
outside of the employer company, such as an insurance 
company, that does not have strong incentives to keep 
employees satisfied by granting meritorious claims. Id. In 
circumstances that warrant a heightened level of review, we 
have held that a court should use a sliding-scale approach, 
examining each case on its facts to determine what level of 
review to apply; the greater the danger of a conflict of 
interest, the less deference the reviewing court should 
apply. Id. 
 




The parties do not dispute that DuPont's pension plan 
gives substantial discretion to the Board to interpret the 
terms of the plan and to administer benefits based on these 
interpretations. Usually, this would counsel a court to 
review the Board's decision under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. Skretvedt argues, however, that Pinto 
requires us to apply a heightened standard in this case 
because: (1) the T & P benefits at issue in this case are part 
of an unfunded plan; and (2) there are procedural defects 
in DuPont's pension and benefits review system. 5 
 
As noted above, the Board first considered Skretvedt's 
incapability claim, and finding that he did not qualify, 
denied his claims for both incapability benefits and for 
T & P benefits. DuPont does not make a regular actuarially 
determined contribution to a fund that supports the 
payment of benefits to employees who are totally and 
permanently disabled, hence the T & P benefits that 
Skretvedt applied for would be paid out of an unfunded 
plan. DuPont's incapability benefits, however, which 
Skretvedt also applied for, are part of a funded plan. As we 
explain in the margin, the mere fact that the T & P benefits 
plan is unfunded does not require applying a heightened 
standard of review to the denial of funded incapability 
benefits.6 However, a heightened standard of review might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Skretvedt also argues that the Board showed a general partiality 
toward DuPont and a failure to appreciate its role as a fiduciary that 
would justify applying a heightened standard of review under Pinto. 
However, he does not document these contentions, and conclusory 
contentions do not constitute "evidence of specific facts calling the 
impartiality of the administrator into question." Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 
442. 
6. While it could conceivably be argued that the Board was biased in its 
evaluation of Skretvedt's incapability benefits claim because it was 
anticipating that a grant of incapability benefits would put it one step 
closer to granting benefits under the unfunded T & P plan, we think that 
this link to the source of the conflict (the unfunded plan) is too 
attenuated to "create[ ] a special danger of a conflict of interest." 
Goldstein, 251 F.3d at 442. As we observed in Pinto, all of the courts of 
appeals that have considered the judicial standard of review over denials 
of benefits governed by ERISA "appear to agree that some level of conflict 
may be unavoidable and not every conflict will heighten the level of 
scrutiny." 214 F.3d at 389. Here, the unfunded plan is at most indirectly 
connected to the incapability benefits determination; therefore any 
conflict that the T & P plan presents does not rise to the level at which 
Pinto counsels heightening the standard of review. 
 




be applicable to the Board's denial of Skretvedt's claim for 
the unfunded T & P benefits, because of the potential 
conflict under Pinto. Because we conclude that the Board's 
reason for denying incapability benefits was arbitrary and 
capricious, see infra Part III.B.4, and because the Board 
relied on the same reason to deny T & P benefits, that 
denial was also arbitrary and capricious. We therefore need 
not decide whether a stricter standard of review is 
applicable to the Board's denial of Skretvedt's claim for 
T & P benefits. 
 
Skretvedt also contends that there are defects in the 
structure and procedure of DuPont's pension and benefits 
review system that require us to apply a heightened level of 
review. These arguments focus mainly on the role that Dr. 
Benjamin Ramirez, Dupont's Associate Medical Director, 
played in the Board's review of claims for disability benefits. 
While he was not a member of the Board, Ramirez was 
involved in evaluating applications for disability benefits at 
both the initial stage and at the appeal level. During the 
period relevant to this case, the initial determination to 
deny an application for disability benefits was not made by 
the three-member Board, but rather by two board 
"delegates": Dr. Ramirez, and Herbert Watson, a DuPont 
benefits administrator. If the delegates decided that the 
employee did not qualify for the benefits that he claimed, 
the employee was notified of the decision and informed that 
he could appeal. At the appeal level, the three-member 
Board (which did not include Ramirez or Watson), would 
vote on whether to change the initial determination, relying 
in part on Dr. Ramirez's recommendation, which he based 
on his review of all of the medical evidence presented. 
 
Skretvedt argues that two features of Dr. Ramirez's 
participation in the evaluation process call into question 
the Board's impartiality in a way that counsels increasing 
the standard of review above arbitrary and capricious. 
 
First, Skretvedt submits that it was improper for Dr. 
Ramirez to be involved in the evaluation process during 
both the initial benefits determination and the appeal. In 
Skretvedt's view, Dr. Ramirez could not impartially advise 
the Board regarding appeals from benefits denials if he 
made the initial determination. But under the ERISA 
 




regulations in effect during the times relevant to this case, 
there was no requirement that the appellate decisionmaker 
even be someone different from the initial decisionmaker. 
See Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton 
Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 534 (7th Cir. 1986); 29 
C.F.R. S 2560.503-1(g)(1) & (2) (2000). Therefore, Ramirez's 
roles as a decisionmaker in the initial proceeding and as an 
advisor in the appellate proceeding are not evidence of a 
conflict of interest that would require heightened review.7 
 
Second, Skretvedt contends that, as DuPont's Associate 
Medical Director, Dr. Ramirez necessarily acted as an 
"advocate" for DuPont, and sought to convince the Board to 
deny Skretvedt's claim on appeal. Skretvedt submits that 
because DuPont had an advocate present at the Board 
meetings, he also should have been permitted to have a 
representative present. 
 
In Grossmuller v. International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 
715 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1983), we held that in order to give 
an ERISA-governed benefits claim "full and fair review" as 
is required by ERISA S 503, 29 U.S.C. S 1133, a 
decisionmaker must allow a claimant to make his case in 
person (or through a representative) if the decisionmaker 
receives testimony from a third party in opposition to 
granting the claim. See id. at 858. Subsequent cases have 
made it clear, however, that Grosmuller extends only to "the 
situation wherein a third party is permitted to appear at a 
meeting and provide factual information which the absent 
claimant cannot refute." Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Dr. Ramirez's role as the initial decisionmaker and as an advisor on 
the appeal level would be permitted even under the new and more 
detailed regulations governing appeals from ERISA benefits 
determinations, which will apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 
2002. See 66 Fed. Reg. 35886 (July 9, 2001). The new regulations 
require only that appellate review of a benefits claim be conducted by 
"an appropriate named fiduciary of the plan who is neither the individual 
who made the adverse benefit determination that is the subject of the 
appeal, nor the subordinate of such individual." 29 C.F.R. S 2560.503- 
1(h)(3)(ii) (2001). Here, Ramirez was not a member of the Board that 
acted as the fiduciary decisionmaker in Skretvedt's appeal, nor is there 
any evidence that the members of the Board were his subordinates. 
 




863 F.2d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, there is no 
evidence that Dr. Ramirez presented any factual testimony 
that Skretvedt did not have a chance to review. Ramirez 
gave an opinion based on his review of the medical reports 
from Skretvedt's own doctors and from Dupont's Dr. 
Layton, all of which Skretvedt had seen. Nor is Ramirez a 
"third party" as contemplated by Grossmuller. 
 
In short, there is no reason to doubt the Board's 
contention that Dr. Ramirez was acting merely as an 
advisor to the Board rather than as an advocate for 
DuPont. Therefore, the District Court was correct to apply 
an arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing the 
Board's denial of Skretvedt's claim for incapability benefits. 
We decline to reach the question whether a stricter 
standard of review is applicable to the Board's denial of 
Skretvedt's claim for T & P benefits. 
 
III. The Board's Decision to Deny Skretvedt's Claim 




The language from DuPont's benefits plan that governs a 
claimant's eligibility for incapability benefits is as follows: 
 
       An employee may be retired by the Company if the 
       Board of Benefits and Pensions finds that he has 
       become, for any reason, permanently incapable of 
       performing the duties of his position with the degree of 
       efficiency required by the Company, and he has at 
       least 15 years of service. 
 
DuPont's Board interprets this language to require that the 
claimant show that his or her incapability was permanent 
at the time of his or her termination. DuPont presented the 
following interpretation to the District Court:"[T]o receive 
an award of benefits: (1) the applicant must present 
evidence that he was permanently (as opposed to 
temporarily) disabled; (2) at the time of the termination; and 
(3) the severity of the disability at termination permanently 
precluded the applicant from performing the duties of his 
position." Mem. Op., Sept. 6, 2000, at 5 n.6. The Board's 
 




interpretation of DuPont's pension and benefits plan is 
entitled to deference under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, unless it is contrary to the plain language of the 
plan. See Epright v. Envt'l Res. Mgmt., 81 F.3d 335, 339 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Because DuPont's interpretation is consistent 
with the plan's language, we apply it here when reviewing 
the Board's denial of Skretvedt's claim for incapability 
benefits. 
 
The reasons that DuPont now offers for denying 
Skretvedt's disability claims are that the medical evidence 
that he presented was not sufficient to show that his 
disability was permanent at the time of his termination, 
and that the evidence was not sufficient to show that his 
disability was severe enough to prevent him from 
performing his previous job at DuPont. We find these 
justifications to be post hoc because they were never offered 




8. The original denial letter sent to Skretvedt merely restated the 
requirements of the benefits plan, concluding that Skretvedt had failed 
to show that he was "permanently incapable of performing the duties of 
[his] job with the degree of efficiency required by the Company, at the 
time of . . . termination," without providing any explanation of why the 
Board reached that conclusion. Dr. Ramirez admitted in deposition that 
the instruction that Skretvedt received in his initial denial letter 
regarding what additional information he needed to provide on appeal in 
order to succeed was a "boilerplate statement." Similarly, the letter that 
the Board sent Skretvedt denying his appeal, while it listed the evidence 
that the Board had before it, did not provide any specific reasons for 
denying the appeal. The Board's failure to provide Skretvedt with 
reasoned explanations for why it denied his disability claims or 
information on what evidence he could present to improve his claims 
raises policy concerns that underlie the notice requirements that ERISA 
places on pension and benefit review boards. Specifically, the review 
boards must give reasons to applicants for denying their claims so that: 
(1) applicants may clarify their application on appeal; and (2) federal 
courts may exercise an informed and meaningful review of the pension 
boards' decisions. 
 
Skretvedt argues that both the Board's initial letter denying his claims 
and the letter denying his appeal provided insufficient notice of the 
reasons for denial to satisfy the requirements of ERISA S 503, 29 U.S.C. 
 




However, we will assume arguendo that it is proper for us 
to consider these post hoc justifications. For the reasons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 1133. Section 503 requires that employee benefit plans "provide 
adequate notice in writing" of a claim denial"setting forth the specific 
reasons for such denial." 29 U.S.C. S 1133(1); see also 29 C.F.R. 
S 2560.503-1(g) (2001). Skretvedt contends that the letters violated S 503 
by failing to provide reasons for the denial and by failing to provide an 
explanation of what would constitute sufficient"objective" medical 
evidence of a psychological disability. One of the main purposes for the 
requirement that the denial letter provide specific reasons "is to provide 
claimants with enough information to prepare adequately for further 
administrative review or an appeal to the federal courts." DuMond v. 
Centex Corp., 172 F.3d 618, 622 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 
We find the lack of explanations in the denial letters that DuPont sent 
Skretvedt troubling. We do not reach the question whether the notice 
was legally inadequate under S 503, however, because we resolve this 
appeal on the ground that, even fully crediting the post hoc rationales 
offered by Dupont, the Board's decision to deny benefits was arbitrary 
and capricious. For the same reason, we decline to reach the question of 
what level of deference is owed to rationales for denying benefits under 
an ERISA-governed plan that a pension board presents for the first time 
in federal court. We take this opportunity, however, to underscore the 
importance of pension boards providing specific reasons for denying 
applicants' benefits claims, both so that applicants may introduce the 
proper evidence on appeal and so that a federal court may exercise 
meaningful review. 
 
We note in this regard our agreement with the policy concerns 
identified in University Hospitals of Cleveland v. Emerson Electric Co., 
202 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2000), where the court held that it would not 
defer to post hoc rationales for denying benefits claims generated for the 
purpose of litigation by ERISA plan administrators when those rationales 
did not appear in the denial letters sent to the benefits claimants or in 
the administrative record. The court observed that: 
 
       it strikes us as problematic to, on one hand, recognize an 
       administrator's discretion to interpret a plan by applying a 
       deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, yet, on 
the 
       other hand, allow the administrator to "shore up" a decision after- 
       the-fact by testifying as to the "true" basis for the decision 
after the 
       matter is in litigation, possible deficiencies in the decision are 
       identified, and an attorney is consulted to defend the decision by 
       developing creative post hoc arguments that can survive deferential 
       review. . . . To depart from the administrative record in this 
fashion 
 




that follow we nonetheless conclude that the Board's 
proffered justifications are unconvincing in light of its own 
interpretation of the eligibility requirements for incapability 
benefits and the medical evidence before it. 
 
B. The Medical Evidence Presented 
 
Skretvedt submitted two sets of medical evidence to the 
Board, one set with his initial application, and another set 
with his appeal. Together, these two sets of medical 
opinions make up the entirety of the medical evidence that 
the Board had before it when it made its decision to deny 
Skretvedt's benefits. Our disposition of the case turns on 
whether this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that 
Skretvedt was permanently disabled at the time of his 
termination and that his disability was (and continues to 
be) severe enough to prevent him from "performing the 
duties of his position with the degree of efficiency required" 
by DuPont. 
 
1. Items Submitted in Skretvedt's Initial Application 
 
The items that Skretvedt submitted with his initial 
application included several letters from his treating 
physicians, Dr. Graenum Schiff and Dr. Harold 
Binhammer, a letter from his treating clinical psychologist, 
Dr. Theresa Buczek, and an evaluation form that Dr. James 
Layton, the Spruance Plant's Medical Director, completed in 
October 1995. 
 
Skretvedt submitted an evaluation report from Dr. Schiff 
dated November 16, 1994, which diagnosed him with an 
"[a]djustment Disorder with anxious mood" and stated that 
he suffered from "severe work stress." At the bottom there 
were handwritten notes explaining that, since he had been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       would, in our view, invite more terse and conclusory decisions from 
       plan administrators, leaving room for them -- or, worse yet, 
federal 
       judges -- to brainstorm and invent various proposed "rational 
       bases" when their decisions are challenged in ensuing litigation. 
 
Id. at 848 n.7. 
 




taking the antidepressant drug Paxil, Skretvedt was"much 
improved." On January 17, 1995, however, Dr. Schiff wrote 
to Dr. Layton that although the antidepressant drug Paxil 
was helping, Skretvedt "is no longer temperamentally suited 
to do the job he was doing at his previous level of efficiency 
. . . and for this reason I would recommend early 
retirement." 
 
In a letter dated January 26, 1995, Dr. Binhammer, 
Skretvedt's family physician, explained that in November 
1994, Skretvedt was in an "acute" state of depressive 
anxiety, which was ameliorated with medication and with 
his leave from work. Binhammer concluded that "Skretvedt 
should not go back to his position as an Environmental 
Engineer . . . because of the anxiety precipatated[sic] to 
him by this type of work and then the resultant breakdown 
in his psyche. At this time while not clearly definable as to 
the length of time, I suspect it may be permanent." 
 
Dr. Buczek, a clinical psychologist who treated Skretvedt, 
wrote two letters to the Board regarding his condition. The 
first, dated January 16, 1995, stated that Skretvedt was 
suffering from emotional problems due to job pressure, and 
that "[i]n regard to the question of whether these 
impairments are temporary . . . I am still unclear. I 
recommend that he be considered unfit for work activity for 
the next 90 days. During that time in therapy, we can 
better determine if he will be able to work at some other job 
in DuPont. I do not believe that he will be able to return to 
his former position, and that this is a very unlikely 
possibility for now or the future." Dr. Buczek's second 
letter, dated January 23, 1995, described Skretvedt's 
symptoms in greater detail, but did not mention his fitness 
for work or the permanence of his condition. 
 
Finally, Skretvedt submitted an evaluation that Dr. 
Layton completed in October 1995. The evaluation 
diagnosed Skretvedt with an "Adjustment Disorder with 
Mixed Emotional Features," and stated "Prognosis: guarded, 
to be able to return to present job assignment . . . because 
of his inability to concentrate and think coherently because 
of stress." On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Board 
denied his benefits claims, stating that "the medical 
evidence submitted does not support a conclusion that you 
 




are permanently incapable of performing the duties of an 
Environmental Engineer with the degree of efficiency 
required by the Company. . . . In order for your appeal to 
be successful, you must provide additional objective 
evidence . . . ." 
 
2. New Documents Submitted on Skretvedt's Appeal  
 
Skretvedt relates that, at this point, he and Dr. 
Binhammer sent a total of three letters requesting 
clarification as to what kind of evidence they should submit 
on appeal. DuPont denies receiving the letters. After he did 
not hear anything further from DuPont, Skretvedt 
attempted to get a complete set of psychological tests 
performed. He then submitted several new sources of 
medical evidence in his appeal application (in addition to 
resubmitting the documents that he had included in his 
initial application).9 
 
The new documents that Skretvedt submitted with his 
appeal application included: two letters from Dr. Richard B. 
Zonderman, a clinical psychologist who in March 1997 
performed a clinical interview and two types of standard 
psychological tests for Skretvedt; updated letters from Drs. 
Schiff and Binhammer; and a letter from the Social Security 
Administration denying Skretvedt's claim for disability 
insurance benefits. 
 
The first Zonderman letter describes the clinical interview 
and two standardized psychological tests: MMPI-2 
(Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), and MCMI- 
III (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory). Based on his 
examination of Skretvedt, Zonderman concluded that 
Skretvedt was at that time experiencing many of the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It is unclear whether the magistrate judge, when reviewing DuPont's 
motion for summary judgment, considered the medical evidence that 
Skretvedt submitted to the Board with his appeal application. The 
magistrate judge's September 6, 2000 memorandum opinion cites and 
discusses only the medical evidence that Skretvedt submitted in his 
initial claim for disability benefits. However, it is proper for us to 
consider all of the medical evidence that Skretvedt submitted since 
DuPont represents that its Board considered all of the medical evidence 
when it denied Skretvedt's appeal. 
 




symptoms that he had complained of in 1994 and 1995, 
and was suffering from a "prominent anxiety disorder." 
Zonderman went on to conclude that "[w]hat began as a 
work related situation has spread and now affects all 
aspects of [Skretvedt's] life" and that"[r]eturn to a job 
resembling the environmental engineering position which 
caused [Skretvedt's] problems would most likely precipitate 
post traumatic stress like symptoms." Zonderman also 
stated that "[w]hatever the etiology, . . . underlying 
personality features will make change difficult and 
protracted." In his second letter, dated July 29, 1998, 
Zonderman opined that Skretvedt's emotional problems had 
been caused by his job, that some of the symptoms had 
been treated by doctors before Skretvedt left his 
employment with DuPont, that Skretvedt was still in 
therapy in July 1998 with two different doctors, and that 
"[h]e cannot return to a similar work environment . . . ." 
 
The first letter from Dr. Schiff, dated May 9, 1997, 
explained that he was writing to supply the evidence 
required by the Board regarding the permanence of 
Skretvedt's condition. The letter noted that Drs. Schiff, 
Buczek, and Binhammer had all examined Skretvedt before 
his termination and concurred that Skretvedt would never 
be able to return to his position at DuPont. The letter 
questioned the Board's requirement of "objective" evidence, 
such as X-rays and MRIs, representing that such evidence 
is impossible to obtain for psychiatric disabilities. Schiff 
concluded by citing two pieces of "objective proof " of the 
permanence of Skretvedt's psychiatric disabilities. First, he 
related that when Skretvedt attempted to return to a job in 
his old field of industrial hygiene (i.e., his job as a 
compliance inspector at the Virginia Department of Labor) 
"his symptoms returned and his condition deteriorated." 
Second, he pointed out that several specialists had 
examined Skretvedt and had all agreed that his condition is 
permanent. 
 
Dr. Schiff 's second letter, dated July 28, 1998, updated 
the previous letter, stating that Skretvedt's anxiety disorder 
had intensified as the two-year training program for his 
entry-level industrial hygiene position was drawing to a 
close, and that as a result, his medication had to be 
 




increased. Dr. Schiff concluded that Skretvedt should not 
be working at all. Moreover, on August 17, 1998, soon after 
writing his second letter, Dr. Schiff recommended that 
Skretvedt go on a two-month medical leave of absence. 
 
An updated letter from Dr. Binhammer, dated May 9, 
1997, stated that, as of that date, Skretvedt would respond 
to stress with "post traumatic episodes," and that these 
symptoms were the same as those "Skretvedt was 
experiencing back in 1994." The letter noted that during 
the time that Skretvedt worked as a furniture refinisher, 
these episodes were less frequent because of the change of 
job environment, but that when Skretvedt attempted to 
return to his old field, the symptoms returned and 
"escalated." The letter concluded: "My prognosis today is 
the same as in 1995, with firmer conviction. More than two 
years have passed and the problems . . . have continued. 
. . . I think time and circumstance have proven our original 
prognosis for Mr. Skretvedt. I continue to believe his 
condition is total and permanent." 
 
Finally, Skretvedt submitted the letter from the Social 
Security Administration denying his claim for disability 
insurance benefits. As discussed above, the SSA concluded 
that Skretvedt was permanently unable to perform his 
previous job at DuPont, but was ineligible for disability 
insurance benefits because he was still able to perform 
other work. 
 
3. DuPont's Contentions Evaluated 
 
DuPont contends that Skretvedt's medical evidence was 
inconclusive with respect to showing (1) that his disability 
was severe enough to render him incapable of performing 
his former job at DuPont; and (2) that Skretvedt's disability 
was permanent as of the time of his termination. The 
District Court agreed. However, we find neither of these 
arguments convincing in the face of the persuasive and 
essentially unrebutted medical evidence that Skretvedt 
presented to the Board. 
 DuPont challenges several of the pieces of medical 
evidence that Skretvedt submitted, arguing that internal 
contradictions or insufficiency in certain pieces of medical 
 




evidence demonstrate that the medical documents are as a 
whole equivocal or inconclusive with respect to either the 
severity or the permanence of Skretvedt's disability, or 
both. We take these up seriatim. 
 
a. Documents Submitted with the Initial Application 
 
DuPont first challenges two evaluations that diagnosed 
Skretvedt with an "Adjustment Disorder," one from Dr. 
Schiff in 1994 and one from Dr. Buczek in 1995. According 
to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), cited by DuPont, 
adjustment disorders are generally triggered by a stressor, 
"and last[ ] no longer than 6 months after the stressor or its 
consequences have ceased." DSM-IV 625 (4th ed. 1994). 
DuPont argues that this treatise demonstrates that the 
psychiatric disorder that Drs. Schiff and Buczek diagnosed 
is not permanent. This argument overlooks the fact, 
however, that the DSM also states that "[i]f the stressor or 
its consequences persist, the Adjustment Disorder may also 
persist." Id. Drs. Schiff and Buczek made it clear in the 
documents in which they diagnosed Skretvedt with an 
adjustment disorder that the stressor that triggered the 
adjustment disorder was Skretvedt's job at DuPont. 
 
More particularly, the narrative section of Dr. Schiff 's 
1994 medical evaluation form focused on Skretvedt's 
complaints about the stresses of his job at DuPont. 
Furthermore, Dr. Buczek's January 16, 1995 letter 
concluded that "[t]his diagnosis and these symptoms 
appear to be related to increased job pressures and 
responsibilities." The relevant question with respect to 
Skretvedt's eligibility for incapability benefits is whether his 
disability renders him permanently incapable of doing his 
previous job. Therefore, the DSM's statement that an 
adjustment disorder will usually last no longer than six 
months after the removal of the triggering stressor does not 
diminish the force of the diagnosis when the stressor that 
the diagnosing doctors identified is Skretvedt's previous job. 
 
DuPont next submits that notes from Dr. Schiff and a 
medical report from Dr. Binhammer show that Skretvedt's 
medical condition improved quickly once he started 
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treatment with the antidepressant drug Paxil, and that 
therefore the condition is not permanent. Handwritten 
notes at the end of Dr. Schiff 's November 16, 1994 medical 
report indicate that Skretvedt was "much improved on 
Paxil." A January 26, 1995 letter from Dr. Binhammer also 
notes that Skretvedt's "Depressive Medical illness [had] 
improved." But the fact that Dr. Schiff 's notes and Dr. 
Binhammer's letter indicate that Skretvedt's depression 
improved with medication does not mean that his condition 
no longer rose to the level of severity that would prevent 
him from doing his previous job at the required degree of 
efficiency. 
 
Reading these statements in the context of the totality of 
the reports and letters in which they appear, it is clear that 
Drs. Schiff and Binhammer meant that Skretvedt's 
condition had improved, not that it had improved to a point 
where he was capable of performing his previous job at 
DuPont. For example, in the same letter in which 
Binhammer wrote that medication and therapy had 
improved Skretvedt's depression, he also wrote that"Mr. 
Skretvedt should not go back to his position as an 
Environmental Engineer . . . because of the anxiety 
precipatated [sic] to him by this type of work and then the 
resultant breakdown in his psyche." 
 
DuPont also points to the statements that Dr. Buczek 
made about the permanence of Skretvedt's condition in the 
materials that Skretvedt submitted with his initial 
application for disability benefits. Specifically, DuPont cites 
a recommendation that Buczek made in her January 16, 
1995 letter -- that Skretvedt should be "considered unfit for 
work activity for the next 90 days" and that he should be 
reevaluated at that time. However, the next sentence in 
Buczek's letter makes it clear that while she held out hopes 
that Skretvedt might at that time "be able to work at some 
other job at Dupont," she did "not believe that he w[ould] 
be able to return to his former position." 
 
b. The Period from 1995 to 1997 
 
DuPont submits that two different aspects of the evidence 
presented regarding Skretvedt's condition during the period 
 




from 1995 to 1997 show that the evidence is equivocal and 
that therefore the Board's denial of disability benefits was 
reasonable. 
 DuPont first contends that Skretvedt's failure to present 
evidence that he received treatment from February 1995 
through March 1997 shows that his condition was either 
insufficiently severe or that it was temporary. But 
Skretvedt's failure to present evidence that he was treated 
during this period does not mean, as DuPont suggests, that 
treatments were suspended because the disability no longer 
existed. Such an inference is unreasonable in light of the 
statement of Dr. Layton, the Spruance Plant's Medical 
Director, that as of October 1995, Skretvedt told him that 
he had stopped receiving treatment from Drs. Schiff and 
Buczek because of the expense. Skretvedt's attorney 
confirmed at argument that Skretvedt had no health 
insurance during much of the period from 1995 to 1997 
and was unable to pay for treatments. 
 
DuPont next argues that the fact that Skretvedt held a 
job at the Virginia Department of Labor during the period 
from 1995 to 1997 that was generally in the same field as 
his job at DuPont shows either that his condition was not 
so severe that it would have prevented him from doing his 
old job at DuPont, or that the condition was not 
permanent, i.e., it had improved enough for him to take a 
position similar to the one he held at DuPont. The 
circumstances surrounding Skretvedt's job at the Virginia 
Department of Labor, however, demonstrate otherwise. 
 
Motivated by financial necessity, Skretvedt abandoned 
his furniture refinishing business, and took what was, 
according to a letter from Dr. Binhammer, an entry-level 
position as a compliance inspector with the Virginia 
Department of Labor. Both Drs. Schiff and Binhammer 
opined that Skretvedt's job as a compliance inspector had 
made his psychological condition as bad or worse than it 
was during the last year of his employment at DuPont. Dr. 
Schiff wrote that "[a]s the end of [the] training approached 
. . . and full responsibilities were assumed, he experienced 
a serious escalation in symptoms." Similarly, describing 
Skretvedt's job at the Department of Labor, Dr. Binhammer 
concluded that when Skretvedt returned to "even a similar 
 




work situation [to his job at Dupont,] the condition 
returned with even more severity." Given these descriptions 
of the return of Skretvedt's symptoms, the fact that 
Skretvedt worked for a time in an entry-level position at the 
Virginia Department of Labor that was generally in the 
same field as his previous job at DuPont does not rebut or 
render inconclusive the medical evidence of his permanent 
inability to do his previous job at DuPont. 
 c. Documents Submitted to the Board for the First 
Time in the Appeal Application 
 
DuPont argues that the 1997 report from Dr. Zonderman 
contains only "general, conclusory" statements, and could 
be interpreted as stating only that current stressors in 
Skretvedt's life in 1997 were causing his illness. In 
addition, DuPont contends that Dr. Zonderman's diagnosis 
that Skretvedt suffered from an Axis I disorder of"Major 
Depression, single episode, moderate chronic," indicates 
that the condition is not permanent. Zonderman's report, 
however, also diagnosed Skretvedt with a psychological 
syndrome that it described as a "longstanding behavioral 
pattern," and recommended that Skretvedt receive 
immediate treatment with both drugs and psychotherapy. 
In a follow-up letter dated July 29, 1998, Zonderman 
indicated that he had been treating Skretvedt since his 
initial evaluation, and that he continued to show symptoms 
of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
 
Dupont also challenges the sufficiency of Schiff 's and 
Zonderman's follow-up letters from 1997 and 1998, 
asserting that they are conclusory and that they do not 
provide conclusions as to whether Skretvedt's condition is 
treatable or permanent, or whether it existed at the time of 
his termination. We are unpersuaded. These brief letters 
were merely introduced to update letters written earlier, 
which do state case dispositive conclusions. Dr. Schiff 's 
earlier letter specified his opinion that Skretvedt's condition 
was permanent. Dr. Zonderman, in his 1998 letter, 
specifically stated that all of the problems began during 
Skretvedt's DuPont employment. 
 




4. Summary--Applying DuPont's Standard for 
Eligibility to the Medical Evidence 
 
The question that the Board faced when reviewing 
Skretvedt's appeal application was whether in light of all 
the medical evidence presented, he demonstrated that he 
was "permanently . . . disabled; at the time of the 
termination; and [that] the severity  of the disability at 
termination permanently precluded [him] . . . from 
performing the duties of his position." Mem. Op., Sept. 6, 
2000, at 5 n.6. The dispositive question is whether, 
applying the Board's interpretation of Dupont's benefits 
plan and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
DuPont, the Board's denial of Skretvedt's claim for 
incapability benefits was arbitrary or capricious, i.e., 
whether it was "without reason [or] unsupported by 
substantial evidence." Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393 (quoting 
Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
In light of the foregoing medical evidence, we conclude 
that even under the deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard, DuPont's denial of Skretvedt's incapability 
benefits claim must be rejected because it was unsupported 
by substantial evidence. The medical evidence provides 
clear support for all three of the elements of the eligibility 
requirements for incapability benefits as DuPont defines 
them. It shows that Skretvedt had a psychological disability 
that: (1) is severe enough to prevent him from performing 
his previous job at the required level of efficiency; (2) is 
permanent; and (3) existed as of the date of his 
termination. Indeed, the medical experts who examined 
Skretvedt concluded unanimously that his psychological 
condition was severe enough to prevent him from 
"performing the duties of his position with the degree of 
efficiency required" by DuPont. While in 1994 and 1995 
some of the doctors expressed uncertainty about the 
duration for which Skretvedt would be required to forego all 
work, all concluded that he could not return to his old job. 
 
Moreover, the follow-up statements of Skretvedt's 
examining physicians and the supplemental medical report 
and letter from Dr. Zonderman confirm their initial 
opinions that Skretvedt's psychological disability is 
 




permanent. In these documents, all of the doctors who 
submitted evaluations for Skretvedt's initial application 
reaffirmed their conclusion that he is not capable of 
performing his old job at DuPont, lending support to their 
previous conclusions that the condition is permanent. Dr. 
Zonderman's evaluation reached the same conclusion, and 
linked Skretvedt's psychological condition to the stresses 
that he faced at work at DuPont. 
 
The letters from Drs. Schiff, Binhammer, and Buczek 
also establish that Skretvedt's condition existed before his 
termination from DuPont in February 1995. All three of 
these doctors examined Skretvedt and diagnosed his 
disorder before he was fired. We find it relevant that Drs. 
Binhammer and Schiff had long-term treatment 
relationships with Skretvedt and that therefore they were 
uniquely able to provide detailed longitudinal information 
on Skretvedt's condition. We have long recognized that in 
the analogous area of disability benefits determinations 
under the Social Security Act, the "opinions of a claimant's 
treating physician[s] are entitled to substantial and at times 
even controlling weight." Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 
34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Cotter v. Harris , 642 F.2d 
700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
For the reasons stated above, although we take the 
evidence in the light most favorable to DuPont, we are not 
convinced by DuPont's arguments that the medical 
evidence was inconclusive or equivocal with respect to the 
severity or permanence of Skretvedt's disability. Because 
the medical evidence that Skretvedt presented makes it 
clear that he meets the eligibility standards for incapability 
benefits, and the Board can point to no conflicting medical 
evidence, we find that the Board's decision was arbitrary 
and capricious because it was "without reason" and it was 
"unsupported by substantial evidence." Pinto, 214 F.3d at 
393 (quoting Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. , 2 F.3d 40, 
45 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
order of the District Court granting summary judgment in 
favor of DuPont and denying summary judgment in favor of 
Skretvedt on the claim for incapability benefits will 
therefore be reversed, and the case remanded to the 
District Court with directions to grant summary judgment 
 




in favor of Skretvedt on the claim for incapability benefits. 
See, e.g., Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 93 
F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 1996) (no remand is necessary 
where no new factual determinations remain). Finally, 
because the Board denied Skretvedt's claim for T & P 
benefits for the same reasons that it denied his claim for 
incapability benefits, we will vacate the District Court's 
order granting summary judgment on the count challenging 
the Board's denial of Skretvedt's application for T & P 
benefits and remand it to the District Court. We assume 
that the District Court will direct that DuPont's Board 
consider this claim in the first instance, since even though 
Skretvedt is incapable of performing the duties of his 
previous position at DuPont, he may nevertheless be 
ineligible for T & P benefits.10  
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Skretvedt has also requested that he be awarded attorneys' fees 
pursuant to ERISA's discretionary fee-shifting provision. That section 
provides that in any action under ERISA "by a participant, beneficiary, 
or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable 
attorney's 
fee and costs of action to either party." 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1). The 
question whether to award attorneys' fees to Skretvedt is a matter of 
discretion, which we remand for the District Court to consider guided by 
the five-factor analysis applied by courts in this circuit when 
considering 
such fee applications. See McPherson v. Employees' Pension Plan of Am. 
Re-Insurance Co., 33 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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